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1Abstrak
Artikel ini mengkaji tentang relevansi lembaga ekonomi kepada ekonomi Islam, khususnya dalam 
bidang Finansial Islam yang tidak begitu ditelaah selama ini. Persoalan relevansi dilihat dari dua 
sudut pandang: secara kewahyuan dan akal; asumsi tentang lembaga-lembaga finansial Islam; 
peran eksternal dan internal dalam mendirikan lembaga finansial Islam. Karena itu, studi ini 
memaparkan bagaimana konsep baru mengenai lembaga ekonomi yang sesuai dengan finansial 
Islam. Adapun rujukan dalam studi ini sangat berkembang pesat dan telah memberikan pengaruh 
yang cukup signifikan dalam kajian keuangan Islam. Dalam kajian ini ditemukan bahwa bidang 
studi ini sangat kaya akan berbagai ide dan pemikiran serta bidang keilmuannya pun sangat luas 
terutama dalam persoalan teori, yang tentu saja akan sesuai dengan kebijakan dan persoalan 
empiris yang ada di dalam kehidupan sehari-hari.
Kata Kunci: Keuangan Islam, lembaga ekonomi, riba, mudharabah, musharakah
Abstract
The study on the relevancy of institutional economics to mainstream Islamic economics especially 
in Islamic finance is not widely known. The relevancy issue arises due to: the role of revelation and 
reason; and the assumption of an ideal Islamic financial institutions; the role of both institutional 
environment and institutional arrangements on the setting-up of the Islamic financial institutions. 
Thus, the discussion in this paper provides a brief (and admittedly unbalanced) sketch of the new 
institutional economics which is relevant to Islamic finance. The literature in NIE is expanding 
rapidly and gaining increasing adherents and influence in Islamic finance. Our findings show that 
it is a highly diverse field and its many branches are rich in theoretical insight, relevant for policy 
and empirically useful.
Keyword:Islamic Finance, Economic Institutions, riba, mudharabah, musharakah
A. Introduction
Institutional economics, as originally known, is a sub-field that focuses on understanding 
the role of the evolutionary process and the role of institutions in shaping economic behavior. 
Its original focus lay in ‘old institutional economics’ usually referred to the writings of Thorstein 
Veblen, John R. Commons, Wesley C. Mitchell, Clarence Ayres and their followers.1 This is a diverse 
group, but their work reflects several common themes, mostly criticisms of orthodox economics: (a) 
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a focus on collective rather than individual action; (b) a preference for an ‘evolutionary’ rather than 
mechanistic approach to the economy; and (c) an emphasis on empirical observation over deductive 
reasoning. (For a sampling of the secondary literature see Seckler (1975); Gruchy (1972); Gruchy 
(1987); Rutherford (1983); Langlois (1989); and Hodgson (1998)). Whatever their contributions, 
the older institutionalists are little known to most contemporary economists. As pointed out by 
Coase’s (1984: 230), dismissal is typical: ‘Without a theory they had nothing to pass on except a 
mass of descriptive material waiting for a theory, or a fire’.
The new institutional economics (NIE) represented originally by Williamson (1975). NIE, 
then, began to develop as a self-conscious field in the 1970s, traces its origins to Coase’s analysis 
of the firm (Coase, 1937), Hayek’s writings on knowledge (Hayek, 1937) and Chandler’s history of 
industrial enterprise (Chandler, 1962), along with contributions by Simon (1947), Arrow (1963: 
941-973), Davis and North (1971), Williamson (1971, 1975, 1985), Alchian and Demsetz (1972: 
777-795), Macneil (1978), Holmström (1979) and others. Its best-known representatives are 
Coase, Williamson and North. For overviews and commentaries see Eggertsson (1990), Furubotn 
and Richter (1991), Coase (1992), Werin and Wijkander (1992), Pejovich (1995), Drobak and 
Nye (1997); and annual symposium issues of the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 
However, NIE plays a relatively minor role in mainstream economics. A major reason institutional 
economics has not kept its position as a major paradigm is attributed to the fact that it was less 
suited to strong mathematical rigor. Developments in evolutionary game theory, and perhaps even 
dynamic mathematics, might alleviate this problem.
Like its older counterpart, NIE is interested in the social, economic and political institutions that 
govern everyday life. In understanding those institutions, NIE tries to combine the inter-disciplinary 
fields such as economics, law, organization theory, political science, sociology and anthropology. 
However, the new institutional economics deviates the holism of the older school. NIE follows 
strict methodological individualism, always couching its explanations in terms of the goals, plans 
and actions of individuals.2 Of course, NIE appreciates social phenomena like corporate culture, 
organizational memory, and so on. 
The first recorded economic institution in Islam  (known as Baitulmal) was established during 
the Prophet S.A.W and later followed by his four companions. The successful of this institution 
had led to the prosperity and the  raising of the standard of living in Muslim countries. In several 
Muslim countries, the Waqf (Endowment)  has been instrumental in financing and thus ensuring 
the smooth running of a large number of public and charitable institutions such institutions include 
mosques, madrassas (educational institutions) orphanages and hospitals.3 
The study on the relevancy of institutional economics to mainstream Islamic economics 
especially in Islamic finance is not widely known. The relevancy issue arises due to: the role of 
revelation and reason; and the assumption of an ideal Islamic financial institutions; the role of both 
institutional environment and institutional arrangements on the setting-up of the Islamic financial 
institutions. Since, for example, reason cannot be independent of faith and morality; and the core of 
Islamic economics – the Quran and the Sunnah – provides guidance, thus the dominant aspects of 
Islamic finance reality and activities partly requires those elements. Therefore, the use of inductive 
reasonings in the field of Islamic finance becomes crucial.
The institutional environment refers to the background constraints, or ‘rules of the game’, that 
guide individuals’ behaviour. These can be both formal, explicit rules (constitutions, laws, property 
rights) and informal, often implicit rules (social conventions, norms). While these background rules 
are the product of - and can be explained in terms of - the goals, beliefs and choices of individual 
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actors, the social result (the rule itself) is typically not known or ‘designed’ by anyone. Institutional 
arrangements, by contrast, are specific guidelines - what scholar such as Chapra and Ahmed (2002), 
Choudhury and Hoque (2006), Grais and Pellegrini (2006), Archer and Rifaat (2007: 295-309), 
Asraf-Wajdi (2008: 391-413) and Hassan (2009: 277-293) calls ‘governance structures’ - designed by 
contracting partners to mediate particular economic relationships. Business entity and contractual 
agreements are examples of institutional arrangements. In the following discussion, those three 
aspects will be discussed separately.
B. Revelation and Reason Related to Islamic Finance
As the foundation of Islamic faith is Tawhid (among others are to believe what has been revealed 
in the Quran and the Sunnah), the guiding principle in doing the economic activities partly requires 
those foundations. Therefore, the use of inductive reasonings in the field of Islamic finance becomes 
crucial. One of the elements in Islamic finance is riba. There are several al-quran injunctions and 
al-hadith condemning and strongly prohibiting riba.
Proofs from the al-quran, Allah does not declare war on anyone except the people who deal in 
riba:
“O you who believe! Observe your duty to Allah, and give up what remains from riba if you are true believers. 
And if you do not, then be warned of war from Allah and His Messenger…” [al-Quran, al-baqarah: 278-
279] 
On the Day of Resurrection, people will rise from their graves quickly, except those who engaged 
in riba. They will stand up and then fall down like epileptics. Whenever they will try to stand up, 
they will fall down because they devoured riba in this world: 
“Those who devour riba will not stand (i.e. on the Day of Judgment) except like the standing of a 
person beaten by Satan leading to madness. That is because they say: ‘Trade is like riba,’ but Allah has 
permitted trade and forbidden riba. Those who after receiving direction from the Lord, cease, shall 
be pardoned for the past; their case is for Allah (to judge); but those who repeat (the offense) are the 
dwellers of the Fire. They will abide therein forever.”  [al-Quran, al-baqarah: 275] 
Allah promises prosperity in this world and the next to those who refrain from and cease this 
abominable practice: 
“O you who believe, do not devour riba, doubled and multiplied but fear Allah; that you may really 
prosper.”  [al-Quran, al-imran: 130] 
Those who devour riba are the rejectors of faith: 
“That they took riba although they were forbidden and that they devoured men’s property wrongfully. 
We have prepared for those among them who reject Faith a grievous punishment.”  [al-Quran, an-
Nisa’: 161] 
Wealth does not increase but decreases in the long run by dealing with riba: 
“That which you lay out of increase through the property of (other) people, you will have no increase 
with Allah…”  [al-Qur’an, al-Rum:39]
Proofs from the al-hadith which explain the forbidden Riba. Everyone who has something to 
do with riba, whether he is one of the main parties involved or is a middleman or facilitator has 
been cursed. The companion Jabir reported: 
“The Messenger of Allah cursed the one who accepted riba, the one who paid it, the one who recorded 
it, and the two witnesses to it.” He said: “They are all alike.”  (Sahih Muslim) 
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‘Aun ibn Hanifa reported from his father that the Prophet SAW had condemned both the receiver of 
interest and its payer. (Bukhari) 
Based on this, it is not permitted to do work that involves writing riba-based contracts and 
conditions, paying or receiving riba, depositing it or guarding it. Generally speaking, it is haram 
or prohibited to be directly or indirectly involved with riba in any way, shape, or form. It is also 
reported that the Prophet SAW said:
“Avoid the seven sins that doom a person to Hell.” They said, “O Messenger of Allah, what are 
they?” He said:  “Associating others in worship with Allah; witchcraft; killing a soul whom Allah has 
forbidden killing, unless that is done lawfully; consuming riba; consuming the property of orphans; 
running away from the battlefield; slandering innocent chaste believing women.”  (Sahih Bukhari 
and Sahih Muslim) 
The ugliness of this major sin can also be seen in the following words of the Prophet SAW: 
“There are seventy-three types of riba, the least of which is as abhorrent as a man having intercourse 
with his own mother and worst of which is violating a Muslim’s honour and sanctity.”  (Al-Hakim) 
Samurah ibn Jundub reported that the Prophet SAW saw in his dream a man standing in a river 
of blood. 
On the riverbank stood a man who had with him stones. Each time the man in the river wanted to 
come out, the man with the stones would throw a stone into his mouth which drives him back to 
his position. The Prophet SAW asked about this man in the river at which he was informed he was a 
man that dealt with riba. (Sahih al- Bukhari) 
During the Isra’ Mikraj, the Prophet SAW passed by a group of people, whose stomaches were 
like that of houses. In these houses were snakes that could be seen from the outside. So the prophet 
asked Jibril about them at which he said: 
“They are the ones who deal with riba.”  (Ahmad) 
The prohibition of riba does not just apply to deals between the rich and poor. It is a general 
prohibition that applies to every person and every situation. Indeed how many rich people and big 
businessmen have gone bankrupt because of riba. The least harm that riba does is to destroy the 
blessing of the money, even if a person’s wealth is great. The Prophet SAW said: 
“Even if riba is much, it will end up being a small amount.” (Al-Hakim) 
In trade, riba make in the payment of an addition by the debtor to the creditor in the exchange 
of commodities of the same kind, such as money for money, flour for flour, rice for rice, etc. The 
Prophet SAW said: 
“Gold is to be paid by gold, silver by silver, wheat by wheat, barley by barley, dates by dates, and salt 
by salt, like by like, payment being made on the spot. If anyone gives more or asks for more, he has 
dealt in riba. The receiver and giver are equally guilty.” (Sahih Muslim) 
An example is found in the hadith collected by Bukhari: 
“Once Bilal brought Barni (a kind of dates) to the Prophet and the Prophet asked him, ‘From where 
have you brought these?’ Bilal replied, ‘I had some inferior type of dates and exchanged two Sa’s of 
it for one Sa’ of Barni dates in order to give it to the Prophet to eat.’ Thereupon the Prophet said, 
‘Beware! Beware! This is definitely Riba (usury). This is definitely Riba (Usury). Don’t do so, but 
if you want to buy (a superior kind of dates) sell the inferior dates for money and then buy the 
superior kind of dates with that money.’” 
The setting up Islamic financial institution is not only based on the revealed knowledge but 
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also the reason related to it.....i.e. we should argue that interest is prohibited to several reasons 
besides. Nowadays we can see that money and financial institutions is more synonym with riba. We 
would now take up the issue, what is the reason behind prohibition of riba, insofar as that reason 
is indicated in Quran. Even though we do not get the reason in the form of a direct statement, 
a number of reasons can be inferred from the texts read in their context. We single out five such 
reasons: riba corrupts society; riba implies improper appropriation of other people’s property; riba’s 
ultimate effect is negative growth; riba demeans and diminishes human personality; and riba is 
unjust.
The first reason reveals itself when we read the above mentioned verse from chapter 30, sura 
Rum, along with some of the preceding and following verses. These read: 
See they not that Allah enlarges the provision for whom He will, and straitens (it for whom he will). 
Lo! Herein indeed are portents for folk who believe. So give the kinsman his due and to the needy, 
and to the wayfarer. That is best for those who seek Allah’s  countenance. And such are they who are 
successful. That which you give in usury in order that it may increase in other people’s property has 
no increase with Allah; but that which you give in charity, seeking Allah’s countenance, has increase 
manifold. Allah is He Who created you and then sustained you, then causes you to die, then gives life 
to you again. Is there any of your (so called) partners (of Allah) that does aught of that? Praised and 
exalted be He above what they associate with him. Corruption does appear on land and sea because 
of (the evil) which men’s hands have done, that He may make them taste a part of that which they 
have done, in order that they may return.(30: 37-41) 
The association of charging interest with fasad is significant. Within the framework of the general 
message that  fasad  in society results from men’s own (wrong) behavior, we can clearly read the 
sub-message that charging interest is one of those wrong behaviors that corrupt the society. As the 
experts say, this may have been the first time, chronologically speaking, that  riba was  mentioned 
in Quran. It was in the fitness of things to highlight its negative social role long before the practice 
of charging interest was banned.
What is meant by  fasad  in the above verse, and in what way charging interest on loans could 
be related to it? Read some of the numerous verses in which the word has occurred in the Quran 
and you get an idea of its dimensions. What is interesting in our context is the inclusion, into 
the concept of fasad, of ‘destruction  of crops and people’ (2:  205), ‘severing the ties of kinship’ 
(47: 22), dividing people into classes and discriminating between  them (28: 4), ‘shedding bloods’ 
(2:30), giving people less than full measure  and wronging them in their goods (11: 85; 26: 183), 
arrogance borne of enormous wealth (28: 77) and sexual perversion (29: 28-30).
The second reason, riba amounting to unlawful appropriation of other people’s  property is 
indicated in the verse from chapter four, sura al-Nisa’ quoted above. In that verse the Jews are 
admonished for ‘taking usury when they were forbidden it, and of their devouring people’s wealth 
by false pretences’ (4: 161). There lies a hint as to a generic connection between  riba and akl bi’l 
batil. Significantly, Quran relates the tendency to appropriate other people’s wealth without any 
justification to some more serious crimes. In (9: 34) it is associated with hoarding and (4 : 29) 
seems to put it at par with murder. 
Considering the serious dimensions of  fasad  and  akl bil-batil to which riba has been related, 
the message seems  to be: charging interest belongs to a mind-set that leads to disruption of civil 
society.
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As rightly pointed out, ‘interest on money is regarded as representing an unjustified creation of 
instantaneous  property rights: unjustified, because interest is a property right claimed outside the 
legitimate framework of recognized property rights; instantaneous, because as soon as the contract 
for lending upon interest is concluded, a right to the borrower’s property is created for the lender’. 
(Khan and Mirakhor, 1987: 4).
The third reason is implied in the declaration that riba is subject to destruction [mahq] (2: 276) 
which means decrease after decrease, a continuous process of diminishing.  That sounds a little odd 
as it runs counter to the commonly observed fact of people growing rich by doing the business of 
lending on interest. Once we leave out the improbable interpretation of individual wealth amassed 
through riba business being subject to continuous decrease, we have to turn to the social wealth. 
Riba, even when it is increasing in numerical terms, fails to spur growth in social wealth. That role 
is played by charitable giving mentioned in the next half of verse 2: 276. Charitable giving transfers 
purchasing power to the poor and the needy who spend it. The destination of interest is not that 
certain.
One needs being reminded that the concept of  mahq  or the implied decrease in  social wealth 
may not necessarily refer to national income in dollars. It could very well be referring to some real 
measure of human felicity. And that takes us to the next reason.
The fourth reason behind prohibition of riba is inferred from verse 2:275 quoted above. This 
verse draws a picture of ‘those who devour usury’ as well as states the reason why they got into that 
pitiable mould. That reason is their being trapped into a false economics that equates trade—the act 
of selling and buying - with the practice of charging interest. (However, it would not be far-fetched 
to surmise that this ‘trap’ was  invented for the simple  folk as we note below). We intend to discuss 
the rejection of this economics below at some length. At this stage we would like to draw attention 
towards the interesting phenomenon of how having your economics wrong can doom you!
We would also like to note that some scholars think the picture painted of the one who takes 
riba belongs to the Day of Judgment, in the hereafter, not in this world. But that still leaves the main 
question unanswered: what is so wrong about taking interest to deserve that fate? The answer to that 
question has to be in line with the cause given in the later part of the verse itself: ‘That is because 
they say: Trade is just like usury’.  It is obvious that the cause lies in the behavior arising from the 
mindset revealed by that saying, not in the mere act of saying. If that is so, the behavior should show 
its effect in this world too. It is, therefore, better not to confine the picture to the hereafter. Let it 
cover both the personality of the riba-eater in this life on earth as well as his/her condition on rising 
from the grave in afterlife to face the Day of Judgment. (Al-Misri, 1991: 42-43).
Regarding the impact of taking interest on personality, the question arises: How can this apply 
to millions of small savers who receive interest on saving accounts? As we shall see later, a plausible 
answer lies in  the generally rising level of anxiety in modern interest based societies. The fact of the 
matter is that in the complex modern economy the relationship between the one who pays interest 
and the one who receives interest is not direct and visible as in the primitive agricultural societies or 
merchant communities of the old. It is mediated by numerous agencies and institutions, which fact 
makes it entirely impersonal. Also, it is invisible. It appears as credit or debit entries in one’s bank 
account. The same  person may be receiving interest as well as paying interest in the same period 
of time. There is no way of understanding the impact of this practice of charging interest on  loans 
taken or of interest paid on loans obtained other than analyzing the system as a whole. It is only 
with reference to modern interest based system of banking, finance and monetary management as 
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a whole that the effects of riba on human personality mentioned in verse 2: 275 or that on society 
mentioned in verse 30: 39 can be understood.
The last, but not the least important, reason of prohibiting riba is its being unjust, as the verse 
2: 279 implies. It clearly states that taking an amount in excess of the principal would be unfair, 
unjust. It also recognizes the right of the lender/creditor to the principal without any decrease as 
that too would be unfair, unjust. The Quran does not argue further as to why it is unfair to take an 
excess in case of loan. Presumably it relies on the notions of equality and reciprocity inherent in 
the concept of justice as indicated in the first chapter above. The unacceptability of injustice and 
unfairness was never in dispute between the Quran and its audience. It continues to be so in the 
modern times. What is not acceptable to many is the Quran’s stand that taking anything in excess 
of the principal amounts to injustice. To resolve this dispute we have to turn back to the difference 
between trade and interest-based transactions. That was the bone of contention between Makkan 
traders opposing the Islamic injunction and the Prophet, as reported in verse 2: 275.
C. The Institutional Environment
The institutional environment forms the framework in which human action  takes place. 
‘Institutions reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life’, writes North (1990: 3). 
‘In the jargon of the economist,  institutions define and limit the set of choices of individuals. 
Institutional constraints include both what individuals are prohibited from doing and, sometimes, 
under what conditions some individuals are permitted to undertake certain activities. ... They are 
perfectly analogous to the rules of the game in a  competitive team sport’ (North, 1990: 3-4). Unlike 
the rules in team sports, however, these guidelines often arise ‘spontaneously’, as by-products of 
individual choices, rather than deliberately through collective action.
(a) The Legal Environment and Legal Right
Law plays an important role in developing the finance field.4 However, the role of Islamic law 
seems to be left out in the current mainstream discussion in finance. Therefore, the aim of this 
section is to discuss the basic idea on the differences of law origin, and financial contracts in Islam 
that may affect the setting-up of financial institutions.
Origin of Islamic Law
The Muslim scholars have unanimously agreed that, when examining any new subject or 
incident that has no rule or legal value, the provisions of the primary bases of Islamic Law must be 
referred to. These are the Quran and the Sunnah that includes the Prophet Muhammad’s (peace be 
upon him) words, deeds and tacit approvals. In a case where there is no equivalent rule provided by 
these two non-arguable sources, usually Islamic scholars will subsequently resort to the secondary 
or dependent sources of law, the Ijma’ (general public consensus), the Qiyas (reasoning by analogy), 
the Maslahah mursalah or Istislah (reasoning by public interest), the Istihsan (preference), the cUrf 
(customs or common practice) and Sadd al-dhara’i (blocking the means).5 Thus, when a jurist wants 
to know the status or legal rule of certain issue or problem, he must refer to the primary sources first, 
according to the order of the sources. Unless he could not find the legal rule or the right solution to 
the issue concerned, he may then refer to the secondary sources, whichever relevant.
Financial Contracts
A contract (‘aqd) is referred to an obligation which arises from a bilateral relationship between 
two parties. In this context, contract is defined as “the conjunction of an offer emanating from one 
of the two contracting parties with the acceptance of the other in the manner that affects the subject 
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matter of the contract”.6 Therefore, a contract is the result of a mutual agreement between the parties 
irrespective of who initiated the offer and who accepted it. 
In addition, for a valid contract to take place in Shari’a, certain conditions are to be met. The 
majority scholars hold that there are three elements of a valid contract namely the form (sighah) 
which comprises of offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul); the contracting parties (al-‘aqidayn) and the 
subject matter (al-ma’qud ‘alayh) i.e. the commodities and the considerations (example: deposits).
The Muslim scholars consider that a contract is completely concluded if there is concurrence of 
offer and acceptance representing the wish of the parties to enter into a contract. Since a contract is 
a bilateral agreement, thus there must be more than one party who are negotiating for the contract, 
and they must be qualified persons possessing the legal capacity (ahliyyah). In addition to that, the 
subject matter of the contract must be defined properly that leave no ambiguity to the contracting 
parties as to the nature of the subject matter. Another important requirement to form a contract is 
the purpose of the contract. As such, the contract must be for good and beneficial purpose according 
to the Shari’a. Consequently, the subject matter of the contract must also be legally acceptable in 
the eyes of Shari’a.
 There are two general financial instruments that could be applied in finance, i.e., investment 
and means of payment. Investment in the form of Mudharabah  is considered as a special form of 
partnership (Musharakah) that has been deployed by modern Islamic financial institutions to provide 
fund management services. In line with the Islamic principles of risk-sharing and profit-sharing, it 
is characterized by one party (rabb al-mal) entrusting his money to another party (mudharib) who 
is akin to a fund manager and who contributes to the arrangement by providing the necessary 
experience and management expertise. The mudharib will utilize the money in an agreed manner, 
and will subsequently return the principal and a share of the profit to the rabb al-mal, retaining a 
pre-agreed share of the profit for him.
Some papers observe that the Mudharabah  contract, along with musharaka contract which 
reflects profit-loss sharing characteristic, has a very strong merit in the sense that it relies on the spirit 
of cooperation. Presley, and Sessions, (1994) have shown that the use of the prevalent alternative 
method of financier remuneration (i.e. Mudharabah) will, under certain conditions, lead to an 
enhanced level of capital investment on account of the ability of Mudharabah  to act as an efficient 
revelation device. By applying the ideas developed in the Western contract literature by Holmstrom 
and Weiss (1985) and Meyer (1986) they show that a Mudharabah contract between a project 
manager and a syndicate of investors may permit a more efficient revelation of any informational 
advantage the manager may have over the latter. Nienhaus (1988) emphasizes that theoretically, 
Islamic banks, through PLS financing, should provide capital to dynamic entrepreneurs who have 
good projects but cannot offer collateral, and so create new business and thus contribute to the 
community’s economic development. 
The important principles to note are: the division of profits must be on a pre-agreed proportional 
basis; if a loss occurs then the rabb al-mal will not usually face liability beyond the loss of principal; 
and the mudharib›s liability will generally be confined to the loss of his time and effort only.
Mudharabah  may be entered into for a single investment or on a continuing basis with the 
Islamic banks acting as a fiduciary. Mudharabah  investments may be made for fixed terms and 
arranged through negotiable instruments (called investment deposit certificates or Mudharabah 
certificates) and in such situations may have characteristics akin to shares.
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The uses of financial instruments as mean of payment can be seen from the following definition. 
For example, Islamic banks act as agent (or wakeel) and hence receive fee payment. The common 
meaning of the word “payment” is “the action, or an act, of paying; the remuneration of a person 
with money or its equivalent; the giving of money, etc. The word is also defined as “a sum of money 
(or other thing) paid; pay, wages; or price”. The verb “to pay,” from which the noun “payment” is 
derived, is variously defined as “to give what is due, as for goods received; remunerate; recompense; 
to give or return as for goods, or services; to give or offer.” However, “to pay” have also been construed 
as meaning “to give money or other equivalent value for; to hand over the price of a (thing); to bear 
the cost of; to be sufficient to buy or defray the cost of”. Thus, although the word payment often 
connoted an exchange of value for the provision of goods or services, or the provision of value on 
the occasion of a particular event or condition, it could also encompass bearing the cost. This latter 
meaning is perhaps the most consistent with the word’s use in the context of a provision defining 
non-performing financings.
Legal Right and Protection under Islamic Finance
From the study done by Tohirin and Ismail (2010) shows that laws varies across countries, 
in part because of differences in legal origin. Hence, how does Islamic law provide legal right to 
the contracting parties? Or, in specific, does Islamic law provides both mudharib and rabbul-maal 
protection? Do the countries (that adopt Islamic law) have other substitute, mechanism of corporate 
governance? Because, the differences in legal protections of contracting parties might help explain 
why firms are financed and owned so differently in different countries. Why do firms practically have 
no excess to external finance? Why is the ownership of firms so widely dispersed (by contract)? The 
content of legal rules in different countries may shed light on these corporate governance puzzles.
The effect of contract can be seen in the rights, obligations and legal effects. These effects are 
not one and the same in all contracts, but they vary from one to another. For example, the effects of 
the contract of sale are the transfer of proprietary rights in things, obligation of the seller to deliver 
goods and establishment of his right to demand the price. The effects of rent are the transfer of 
proprietary rights in usufruct to the tenant. Thus, we find that these effects differ from one contract 
to another.
It can be said in general that the following effects accrue from the contracts. First, the owner 
has the obligations to perform the transfer of proprietary rights in things or usufruct, commutative 
or non-commutative, such as sale, gift, rent, and borrowing. Second, obligation of performing a 
specified work regardless whether this work is the delivery of fungible property which is a debt 
which a person owes to another, such as contract of loan, or it is some other work, such as the work 
of a hiring or agent. Third, arising the right of security as, for example, in pledge, surety and bail, 
and transfer of debt.
The general rule is that the above effects accrue only from the contract which fulfils the conditions 
of its constitution and validity, and with which no attribute which requires the Lawgiver’s prohibition 
against it is associated. But some jurists maintain that some of these effects sometimes accrue from 
a void contract, and it is one with which an attribute required by the Lawgiver’s prohibition is 
associated.
The general principle is that these effects arise and accrue from a contract after its existence. But 
there are some contracts whose effects keep away from them till permission is attached to them: 
According to the Muslim jurists, they are called the suspended contracts or contracts in abeyance.
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When these effects accrue from the contract, the general rule is that they are binding on both 
contracting parties. Neither of them can dissociate itself from it. But there are some contracts whose 
effect accrues from it when both parties grant the unilateral right of cancellation, or one of them 
does so without the consent of the other party. These are called permissible contracts, or contracts 
that are not binding.
These effects accrue from the contract by making and taking it into consideration by the Lawgiver 
and the intention of the contracting parties has nothing to do with it. A contract, in the opinion of 
the Muslim jurists, is a cause of accrual of effects from it. The general rule is that accrual of effects 
from causes is on account of making, and act of the lawgiver; the intention of the contracting parties 
has nothing to do with that.
Accordingly, the jurists maintain that every condition which is attached to the contract and 
deviates from its effects is invalid. They call this condition repugnant or contrary to the essence 
or nature of the contract. But the conditions that are consistent with the essence or nature of the 
contract and confirm the effects which accrue from it are permitted according to all jurists, because 
they strengthen these effects and confirm their execution such as the stipulation of pledge and 
surety.
There is another set of conditions about which disagreement arose. These are the conditions 
which neither agree nor disagree with the essence or nature of contract, and set restrictions on the 
freedom of the contracting parties, regardless whether or not they comprise the benefits of the 
stipulating party.
The established rule in the Shari’a is the obligation of fulfilment of contracts and conditions 
which do not make an unlawful thing lawful and a lawful thing unlawful. Allah, the Exalted, said: 
“O you, who believe, fulfil the obligations”. (5:1) The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: “The 
believers are bound by their conditions, except a condition which makes an unlawful thing lawful 
and a lawful thing unlawful”. This shows that the contract is the law of the contracting parties as 
maintained by modern law.
The application of this rule requires that the contracting parties are bound to execute the 
obligations that accrue from the contract without having the right of modifying it or dissociating 
from it, except in cases about which specific texts of the Shari’a have occurred. If one of the contracting 
parties does not execute the obligations which the contract imposes on him of his own accord, the 
other party can compel him to execute them judicially, as the Lawgiver grants this contracting party 
the right of abstaining from executing the equivalent or opposite obligation or to demand the 
annulment of the whole contract.
The general rule in Islamic law is, as is the case of positive law that these contracts are not 
binding on any other than their contracting parties and no one other than the parties can benefit 
from them. The fulfilment of obligations that result from the contract is not binding on any person 
other than the parties to it, as no one except them can benefit from the rights established by the 
contract.
We shall see that there are some cases, in each of the Islamic law and positive law, in which the 
effects of the contract are traceable to the persons other than the contracting parties. These contracts 
are called general or particular discrepancy in positive law. These cases are considered to be an 
exception to the general rule of relativity of contracts with respect to persons.
As for Mudharabah contract, the contracting parties are the capital provider (shahib-al-maal) 
and the entrepreneur (mudharib). The principal obligation of the capital provider is to provide the 
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capital needed by the entrepreneur, whereas the obligation of entrepreneur mainly to manage the 
capital in his/her business venture/project in a responsible and trustworthily manner so that the 
business he/she managed capable of creating value added (profit) that will be shared according 
to the pre-agreed ratio. The capital provider right mainly is to get the profit share or to born the 
financial loss without having any control in the management of the business/project. Based on this 
nature Mudharabah  financing usually be called as trusty financing. 
In current development of Islamic banking practices, Mudharabah  contract is widely applied 
in both sides of intermediary function of Islamic banks, i.e. funding and financing sides. In 
funding side, Mudharabah  deposits, either in saving account or mainly in investment/time deposit 
account are the major component of bank’s deposits. Even though this is quite similar with those 
in conventional banking system, profit-sharing nature of Islamic bank’s deposit has important 
advantage to the financial system compared to their conventional counterpart. At this juncture we 
can compare the depositors and the shareholders in the Islamic banking system. Both are similar in 
providing financial capital to the banks, even much higher proportion for depositors, but the rights 
of both capital-givers are quite different. Table 1 below exhibits a comparison between depositors 
and shareholders in Islamic banking.
Table 1: Depositors and Shareholders Comparison in the Islamic Banking System
Depositors Shareholders
Contracts Mudharabah Musharakah





Return on Deposits based on Pre-agreed 
Profit Share 
No Voting Right
No specific control right
Dividends
Voting Rights
Control rights via Shareholders General 
Meeting
Obligation No obligation bounded Oblige to add capital if deem 
Necessary
Risk Exposed to all business risk Exposed to all business risk
Protection Under Deposits Insurance Scheme only. 
Need to have a kind of specific protection 
by providing access to the management 
Shareholder protection under the 
prevailing laws
The existence of Mudharabah  deposits, along with Mudharabah  and musharaka financings, under 
Islamic banking system exposes very different character from that in interest-based deposits. This 
difference actually has important implication into the financial system, in the sense that it drives the 
system to be more stable due to a balance between asset and liability sides of the system. In addition, 
Mudharabah  deposits in fact may be treated as “equity capital” similar to shareholders funds. Based 
on these reasoning, it is therefore important to consider specific institutional protection mechanism 
for Mudharabah  depositors, especially if the system allows Islamic banks to co-exist side by side with 
conventional banks.
As for Mudharabah  financing from the banks’ viewpoint it is also important to provide specific 
enforceable regulation mechanism as a truth revealing devices for the financed parties to avoid 
any miss-reporting of their business ventures. In this regard Gonzales de-Lara (2001) recorded the 
experience of the Late Medieval Venice that the existence of state enforcer of contract had been 
effectively used for risk-sharing contract by Venetian merchants. It had driven the shift of contractual 
agreement from the sea-loan contracts (which is debt-based) to the commenda contracts (which is 
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profit-loss-sharing based). Applying this spirit into current practices of Islamic banking and finance 
might drive the implementation of profit-loss sharing financing more significantly.
(b) Evolution in Islamic Finance and  Wealth Creation
Attention to the institutional environment has become increasingly common in economic 
history and it has deeply enriched our understanding of how Islamic financial institutions develop 
through time. The development is important in creating wealth.
The maqasid shari’ah is aimed to make the distribution of economic resources, wealth and 
income fair and equitable. Islam discourages concentration of wealth in few hands and ensures 
its circulation among all the sections of society. It means that the wealth should not be allowed to 
concentrate in few rich hands; rather it should freely circulate among all the people thus enabling 
the poor and destitute among the nation to also take benefit from it.7 Thus it is the utmost important 
that the Islamic banking system could bridge the gap between the rich and the poor by modifying 
the distribution of wealth and economic resources in favor of the less-fortunate.
In this section, the above issues are important to be addressed due to three reasons. First, it will 
address the wealth creation in Islamic banking system. Second, Islamic economic system ensures 
fair and equitable distribution of wealth through positive as well as negative measures.8 Third, by 
abolishing interest rate, does it mean that Islamic banks are able to distribute the income more 
equitable?
Therefore, in this section, we will examine the wealth created by Islamic banks. How the money 
invested by customer (depositors), or money invested by banks or money (as capital) utilized by 
customers (or economic agents like individual, firm and government) can generate profit and then 
can be distributed to Islamic banks and depositors  and hence would be able to preserve the wealth 
(mal) of economic agents.
As shown in Table 2, Islamic bank A could meet their primary financial objectives of strong 
value-added growth. This increased from RM17.6 billion in 2007 to RM20.2 billion in 2008. As 
a result, the distribution of wealth to employees, government and shareholders increased from 
RM7.6 billion, RM2.8 billion, and RM1.9 billion in 2007 to RM8.5 billion, RM2.9 billion and 
RM2.3 billion in 2008, respectively. At the same time, the retained earnings also increased from 
RM5.5 billion in 2007 to RM6.5 billion in 2008. The figures above show a significant contribution 
by Islamic bank A to the economy during the period of 2004-2008. On the average, as shown 
in Diagram 1, the employees, government, shareholders (all are economic agents) and retentions 
received about 44.2%, 15.2%, 10.2% and 30.4%, respectively of the total wealth. 
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•	 Dividends paid to shareholders
•	 Earnings attributable to outside and preference 
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•	 Retentions to support future business growth
•	 Retained surplus






























Wealth distribution over five years (%)
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
Employees 42 43 46 44 46
Government 15 16 16 15 14
Shareholders 11 10 10 10 10
Retentions 32 31 28 31 30
D. The Institutional Arrangements and the Theory of Islamic Financial Institutions
These rules and customs that make up the institutional environment are primarily economy-
side phenomena. Another aspect of the new institutional economics focuses on agreements made 
by specific individuals to govern their own relationships. Such institutional arrangements - what 
Williamson (1996b: 5) calls the institutions of governance - include contracts and organizations 
and in particular, the business firm. The study of governance is more dull  than the study of the 
institutional environment. ‘Questions of whether to make or buy a component to be used in the 
manufacture of an automobile or whether to expand the hospital into outpatient and home health 
services are ones that arise at the level of governance. By contrast, composite economic growth and 
income distribution are more apt to be the objects of interest in an inquiry into the institutional 
environment’ (Williamson, 1996b: 5). However, the study of governance - in particular, the theory 
of the firm - is arguably more developed than the study of the institutional environment. Therefore, 
in this section, the institutional arrangements will be linked with the theory of Islamic financial 
institutions.
The early contributions on the theory of Islamic banking were only discussed as part of the 
subject in Islamic economic system. For example, the book by Qureshi on Islam and the Theory of 
Interest (Qureshi (l946)) which looked upon banking as a social service that should be sponsored 
by the government like other public institutions such as public health and education.9 His view was 
based on the point that the bank could neither pay any interest to account holders nor charge any 
interest on loans advanced. He also suggests the possibility for both Islamic banks and entrepreneur 
to create a partnership. No mention was made of profit-sharing.
Then, Ahmad (1952), in Chapter VII of his book Economics of Islam, proposes the establishment 
of Islamic banks on the basis of a joint stock company with limited liability. In his proposition, in 
addition to current accounts, on which no dividend or interest should be paid, there was an account 
in which people could deposit their capital on the basis of partnership, with shareholders receiving 
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higher dividends than the account holders from the profits made. Like Qureshi (1946), Ahmad 
(1952) also suggests of possible partnership arrangements with the entrepreneur who seek capital 
from the Islamic banks. However, the partnership principle was left undefined, nor was it clear 
who would bear the loss if any. It was also suggested that Islamic banks should cash bills of trade 
without charging interest, using the current account funds. From here, Islam banks only charge fee 
to entrepreneur.
Later, the principle of mudarabah was appealed systematically by Uzair (l955). His main 
contribution lay in suggesting mudarabah as the main premise for ‘interestless banking’. However, 
his argument that the Islamic bank should not make any capital investment with its own deposits 
rendered his analysis somewhat impractical.
Al-Arabi (l966: 10-16) also suggested a banking system with mudarabah as the main pivot. 
However, he advanced further the idea of a two-tier mudarabah which would enable the Islamic 
bank to mobilize savings on a mudarabah basis, allocating the funds also on a mudarabah basis. In 
other words the Islamic bank would act as a mudarib in so far as the depositors were concerned, 
while the ‘borrowers’ would act as mudaribs in so far as the Islamic bank was concerned. In his 
suggestion, the Islamic bank could provide not only the capital procured through deposits but also 
the capital of its own shareholders. He also took note that his view with regard to the distribution 
of profits and the responsibility for losses was strictly in accordance with the Shariah.
Irshad (l964) also spoke of mudarabah as the basis of Islamic banking, but his concept of 
mudarabah was quite different from the traditional one in that he thought of capital and labour 
(including entrepreneurship) as having equal shares in output, thus sharing the losses and profits 
equally. This actually means that the owner of capital and the entrepreneur have a fifty-fifty share in 
the profit or loss as the case may be, which runs against the Shariah rulings. Irshad (1964) further 
suggested two kinds of deposit accounts. The first sounded like current deposits in the sense that it 
would be payable on demand, but the money kept in this deposit would be used for social welfare 
projects, as the depositors would get zero return. The second one amounted to term deposits which 
would entitle the depositors to a share in the profits at the end of the year proportionately to the 
size and duration of the deposits. He recommended the setting up of a Reserve Fund which would 
absorb all losses so that no depositor would have to bear any loss. According to Irshad (1964), all 
losses would be either recovered from the Reserve Fund or borne by the shareholders of the bank.
A pioneering attempt at providing a fairly detailed outline of Islamic banking was made in Urdu 
by Siddiqi in l968. (The English version was not published until l983.) His Islamic banking model 
was based on mudarabah and shirkah (partnership or musharakah as it is now usually called). His 
model was essentially one based on a two-tier mudarabah financier-entrepreneur relationship, but 
he took lengthy explanation to describe the mechanics of such transactions in considerable detail 
with numerous hypothetical and arithmetic examples. He classified the operations of an Islamic 
bank into three categories: services based on fees, commissions or other fixed charges; financing 
on the basis of mudarabah and partnership; and services provided free of charge. His thesis was that 
such interest-free banks could be a viable alternative to interest-based conventional banks.
The issue of loans for consumption clearly presents a problem, as there is no profit to be shared. 
Siddiqi addressed this problem, but he managed only to scratch the surface. While recognizing the 
need for such interest-free loans (qard hasan), especially for meeting basic needs, he seemed to think 
it was the duty of the community and the State (through its baitul mal or treasury) to cater to those 
needs; the Islamic bank’s primary objective, like that of any other business unit, is to earn profit. 
He therefore tended to downplay the role of Islamic banks in providing consumption loans, but 
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he suggested limited overdraft facilities without interest. He even considered a portion of the fund 
being set aside for consumption loans, repayment being guaranteed by the State. He also suggested 
that consumers buying durables on credit would issue ‘certificates of sale’ which could be ended 
by the seller at the bank for a fee. It was then the seller not the buyer who would be liable as far as 
the bank was concerned. However, the principles of murabaha and bai’ muajjal were not invoked. It 
seems that his suggestion is far from reality.
Strangely, Siddiqi favoured keeping the number of shareholders to the minimum, without 
advancing any strong reasons. This is contrary to the general consensus which now seems to have 
emerged with reference to Islamic banks operating on a joint stock company basis, a consensus 
which incidentally is also in line with the Islamic value attached to a broad equity base as against 
heavy concentration of equity and wealth. Ironically, Siddiqi (1983b) thought that interest-free 
banking could operate successfully ‘only in a country where interest is legally prohibited and any 
transaction based upon interest is declared a punishable offence’. He also thought it important 
to have Islamic laws enforced before interest-free banking could operate well. This view has not 
gained acceptance, as demonstrated by the many Islamic banks which operate profitably in ‘hostile’ 
environments, as noted earlier.
Chapra’s model of Islamic banking (Chapra l982), like Siddiqi’s, was based on the mudarabah 
principle. His main concern, however, centred on the role of artificial purchasing power through 
credit creation. He even suggested that ‘seigniorage’ resulting from it should be transferred to the 
public exchequer, for the sake of equity and justice. Al-Jarhi (l983) went so far as to favour the 
imposition of a l00 per cent reserve requirement on commercial banks. Chapra was also much 
concerned about the concentration of economic power private banks might enjoy in a system 
based on equity financing. He therefore preferred medium sized banks which are neither so large 
as to wield excessive power nor so small as to be uneconomical. Chapra’s scheme also contained 
proposals for loss-compensating reserves and loss-absorbing insurance facilities. He also spoke of 
non-bank financial institutions, which specialize in bringing financiers and entrepreneurs together 
and act as investment trusts.
Mohsin (l982) has presented a detailed and elaborate framework of Islamic banking in a modern 
setting. His model incorporates the characteristics of commercial, merchant, and development 
banks, blending them in novel fashion. It adds various non-banking services such as trust business, 
factoring, real estate, and consultancy, as though interest-free banks could not survive by banking 
business alone. Many of the activities listed certainly go beyond the realm of commercial banking 
and are of so sophisticated and specialized a nature that they may be thought irrelevant to most 
Muslim countries at their present stage of development. Mohsin’s model clearly was designed to 
fit into a capitalist environment; indeed he explicitly stated that riba-free banks could coexist with 
interest-based banks.
The point that there is more to Islamic banking than mere abolition of interest was driven home 
strongly by Chapra (l985). He envisaged Islamic banks whose nature, outlook and operations could 
be distinctly different from those of conventional banks. Besides the outlawing of riba, he considered 
it essential that Islamic banks should, since they handle public funds, serve the public interest 
rather than individual or group interests. In other words, they should play a social-welfare-oriented 
rather than a profit-maximizing role. He conceived of Islamic banks as a crossbreed of commercial 
and merchant banks, investment trusts and investment-management institutions that would offer 
a wide spectrum of services to their customers. Unlike conventional banks which depend heavily 
on the ‘crutches of collateral and of non-participation in risk’ (Chapra, 1985: l55), Islamic banks 
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would have to rely heavily on project evaluation, especially for equity-oriented financing. Thanks to 
the profit-and-loss sharing nature of the operations, bank-customer relations would be much closer 
and more cordial than is possible under conventional banking. Finally, the problems of liquidity 
shortage or surplus would have to be handled differently in Islamic banking, since the ban on 
interest rules out resort to the money market and the central bank. Chapra suggested alternatives 
such as reciprocal accommodation among banks without interest payments and creation of a 
common fund at the central bank into which surpluses would flow and from which shortages could 
be met without any interest charges.
From the above discussion, Islamic banking has three distinguishing features: (a) it is interest-
free, (b) it is multi-purpose and not purely commercial, and (c) it is strongly equity-oriented. The 
literature contains hardly any serious criticism of the interest-free character of the operation, since 
this is taken for granted, although concerns have been expressed about the lack of adequate interest-
free instruments. There is a near-consensus that Islamic banks can function well without interest. A 
study by Iqbal and Mirakhor (l987) has found Islamic banking to be a viable proposition that can 
result in efficient resource allocation. The study suggests that banks in an Islamic system face fewer 
solvency and liquidity risks than their conventional counterparts.
The multi-purpose and extra-commercial nature of the Islamic banking operation does not 
seem to pose intractable problems. The abolition of interest makes it imperative for Islamic banks 
to look for other instruments, which renders operations outside the periphery of commercial 
banking unavoidable. Such operations may yield economies of scope. But it is undeniable that the 
multipurpose character of Islamic banking poses serious practical problems, especially in relation 
to the skills needed to handle such diverse and complex transactions (Iqbal and Mirakhor l987).
The stress on equity-oriented transactions in Islamic banking, especially the mudaraba mode, 
has been criticized. It has been argued that the replacement of predetermined interest by uncertain 
profits is not enough to render a transaction Islamic, since profit can be just as exploitative as interest 
is, if it is ‘excessive’ (Naqvi l98l). Naqvi has also pointed out that there is nothing sacrosanct about 
the institution of mudaraba in Islam. Naqvi maintains that mudaraba is not based on the Qur’an or 
the Hadith but was a custom of the pre-Islamic Arabs. Historically, mudaraba, he contends, enabled 
the aged, women, and children with capital to engage in trade through merchants for a share in the 
profit, all losses being borne by the owners of capital, and therefore it cannot claim any sanctity. The 
fact remains that the Prophet raised no objection to mudaraba, so that it was at least not considered 
un-Islamic.
The distribution of profit in mudaraba transactions presents practical difficulties, especially where 
there are multiple providers of capital, but these difficulties are not regarded as insurmountable. The 
Report of Pakistan’s Council of Islamic Ideology (CII l983) has suggested that the respective capital 
contributions of parties can be converted to a common denominator by multiplying the amounts 
provided with the number of days during which each component, such as the firm’s own equity 
capital, its current cash surplus and suppliers’ credit was actually deployed in the business, i.e., on a 
daily product basis. As for deposits, profits (net of administrative expenses, taxes, and appropriation 
for reserves) would be divided between the shareholders of the bank and the holders of deposits, 
again on a daily product basis.
However, lately, several authors among others Abdus Samad et. al (2005: 69-86) raised the 
agency problem in mudarabah and musharakah contracts. When a business is run by professional 
managers, as opposed to the owner or supplier of capital (shareholder), a conflict of interest 
may arise. A manager is the business owner’s agent. As the utility increases, managers will seek to 
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maximize their own utility instead of maximizing the wealth or utility of the shareholders or the 
business owners. They have an incentive to increase their own salaries, fringe benefits, and other 
perks, all of which represent a conflict of interest that may lead them to place personal interest ahead 
of such corporate goals as maximizing the shareholders’ profit margin. This conflict is the most 
common problem in all businesses or corporations managed by agents rather than the shareholders 
or debtholders.
Given its prevalence, it is important to see how it applies to mudarabah and musharakah. In 
musharakah mode of financing, a joint venture profit-sharing business of two or more parties in 
which the Islamic bank is an important partner or shareholder. Under musharakah, the bank relies 
on the other partner(s) to manage the business and make the day-to-day decisions. Even though the 
bank could monitor the management of the business by hiring external auditors and consultants, 
such measures would incur additional costs. Therefore, the bank must rely on professional managers 
or other partners to manage the businesses, even though these managers may have an incentive to 
maximize their own utility at the business owner’s expense.
Under mudarabah/musharakah financing, the Islamic bank does not participate directly in 
management decisions. Rather, it relies completely on the business venture’s trustee or entrepreneur. 
This trustee is clearly an agent of the Islamic bank and, therefore, is inherently subject to the agency 
conflict of interest. Thus, under both musharakah and mudarabah, the Islamic bank experiences the 
agency problem with its associated costs.
The agency problem becomes more acute when banks have little access to dependable accounting 
information, due to a lack of standardized financial reporting requirements and procedures. The 
difficulties presented by this agency problem, together with the lack of verifiable financial data, 
complicate the profit-sharing characteristics of these forms of Islamic financing and actually 
encourage debt financing (e.g., murabahah and ijarah) over equity financing (e.g., musharakah and 
mudarabah). To some extent, the agency problem in musharakah and mudarabah can be reduced by 
carefully specifying the sharing of profit and performance bonuses between the entrepreneur and 
the bank. Also, in the case of musharakah, the bank participates in the election of the company’s 
board and officers, a factor that should further reduce the agency problem.
E. Conclusion
The discussion in this paper provides a brief (and admittedly unbalanced) sketch of the new 
institutional economics which is relevant to Islamic finance. The literature in NIE is expanding 
rapidly and gaining increasing adherents and influence in Islamic finance. Our findings show that 




2 This is in line with the objective of capitalist system. We should link it with the  earlier view of 
institutional economics which tries to relate both field i.e. law and economics. law and economics has been a 
major theme since the publication of the Legal Foundations of Capitalism by John R. Commons in 1924. 
3  Refer to Abdul Ghafar Ismail, Mohd Ezani Mat Hassan, Norazman Ismail dan Shahida Shahimi (2010) 
Proceedings of Seventh International Conference “The Tawhidi epistemology: Zakat and Waqf Economy”. 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.
4 See, La Porta et al. (1998) Levine et al. (2000) and Beck and Levine (2002).
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5 There are a few other secondary sources that scholars rarely resort to, they are, Sharc man qablana (the 
divine rules of other Prophets) and Madhhab al-sahabi (words and deeds of the companions of the Prophet).
6 Refer to the Mejelle (Art. 103), translated by Tyser, C.R., D.G. Demetriades and Ismail Haqqi Effendi. 
Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press.
7 Refer to surah Al-Hashr 59:7, Allah says: “That which Allah give that as spoil unto His messenger from 
the people of the townships, it is for Allah and His messenger and for the near of kin and the orphans and the 
needy and the way farer, that it become not a commodity between the rich among you.”
8 Both measures are introduced  via the preservation of mal such Zakat and Sadaqat, laws of inheritance 
and will; and the identification of things that threaten mal such as payment of interest, prohibition of earning 
of wealth by Haram (unlawful) means, and prohibition of hoarding.
9 Although earlier than Qureshi (1946), there are other publications in Arabic and Urdu which have 
made significant contributions to the theoretical discussion. A brief description of these in English can be 
found in the appendix to Siddiqi’s book on Banking without Interest (Siddiqi l983a).
Daftar Pustaka
Abdus Samad, Norman D. Gardner, and Bradley J. Cook. 2005. “Islamic Banking and Finance in 
Theory and Practice: The Experience of Malaysia and Bahrain,” The American Journal of Islamic 
Social Sciences 22, no. 2.
Ahmad, S.M. 1952. Economics of Islam. Lahore. 
Al-Arabi, Mohammad Abdullah. l966. “Contemporary Banking Transactions and Islam›s Views 
Thereon,” Islamic Review, May l966. 
Alchian, Armen A. and Demsetz, Harold. 1972. “Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization,” 62 American Economic Review. 
AlJarhi, Ma’bid Ali. 1983. “A monetary and financial tructure for an interest free economy, 
institutions, mechanism and policy,” in Ziauddin, Ahmad et al. (eds.), Money and Banking in 
Islam. Jeddah: International Centre for Research in Islamic Economics. 
Archer, S. and Rifaat, A.A.K. 2007. “Specific Corporate Governance Issues in Islamic Banks,” In 
Rifaat, A.A.K. and Archer, S. (Ed.) Islamic Finance: The Regulatory Challenge. Singapore:  John 
Wiley & Sons (Asia).
Ariff, M. 1988. Islamic Banking in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
______. 1988. “Islamic Banking,” Asian-Pacific Economic Literature. Vol. 2, No. 2 (September).
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1963. “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care,” 53 American 
Economic Review.
Beck, T., Levine, R. 2002. “Industry growth and capital allocation: does having a market- or bank-
based system matter?” Journal of Financial Economics 64, 2.
Chapra, M. Umer. 1985. Toward a Just Monetary System. Leicester:  The Islamic Foundation.
______. 1982. “Money and Banking in an Islamic economy,” in M Ariff (ed.), Islamic Banking in 
Southeast Asia. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Chapra, M.U. and Ahmed, H. 2002. Corporate Governance in Islamic Financial Institutions. Jeddah: 
IRTI. 
Choudhury, M.A. and Hoque, M.Z. 2006. “Corporate governance in Islamic Perspective, Emerald 
Group Publishing Limited,” Corporate Governance, Vol. 6, Issue 2.
Abdul Ghafar Ismail & Fadhilah Mat Nor: Institutional Economics Relevant to Islamic Finance  |  19
Choudhury, M.A. 1988. “The growth of Islamic banking”, manuscript available at http://faculty.uccb.
ns.ca/mchoudhu/Islamicbanking.htm
Coase, Ronald H., 1937. “The Nature of the Firm,” in Ronald H. Coase (ed.), The Firm, the Market, 
and the Law. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
______. 1984. “The New Institutional Economics,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 
140.
______. 1992. “The Institutional Structure of Production,” American Economic Review, 82. 
Commons, J. 1931. “Institutional Economics,” American Economic Review Vol. 21.
Drobak, John N. and Nye, John V.C. 1997. The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics. San Diego: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Eggertsson, Thrainn. 1990. Economic Behavior and Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Furubotn, Eirik and Richter, Rudolf. 1991. The New Institutional Economics: An Assessment. Texas: 
Texas A&M University Press.
Grais, W., and Pellegrini, M. 2006. “Corporate Governance and Stakeholders’ Financial Interests in 
Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 4053.
Gruchy, Allan G. 1972. Contemporary Economic Thought: The Contribution of Neo-Institutional Economics. 
Clifton, NJ:  Augustus M. Kelley.
Gruchy, Allan G. 1987. The Reconstruction of Economics: An Analysis of the Fundamentals of Institutional 
Economics. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Hassan, Z. 2009. “Corporate Governance: Western and Islamic Perspectives. International Review of 
Business Research Papers Vol.5 No. 1.
Hayek, F.A. 1937. Individualism and Economic Order. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Iqbal, Zubair and Mirakhor, Abbas. 1987. Islamic Banking, International Monetary Fund Occasional 
Paper 49, Washington D.C. 
Irshad, S.A. 1964. Interest Free Banking. Karachi: Orient Press of Pakistan. 
Ismail, A.G. 2010. “Islamic banks and wealth creation.” ISRA Research Paper no. 10.
Ismail, A.G. 2010. Money, Islamic Banking and Real Economy. Singapore: Cengage Learning Asia Pte. 
Ltd.
Ismail, A.G. and Tohirin, A. 2009. “Finance and Growth: The Role of Islamic Contracts,” MPRA Paper
 13744, Germany University Library of Munich.
Ismail, A.G. and Tohirin, A. 2010. “Islamic law and Finance.” Humanomics (forthcoming).
Ismail, A.G., Mohd Ezani Mat Hassan, Norazman Ismail dan Shahida Shahimi. 2000. “The Tawhidi 
pistemology: Zakat and Waqf Economy.” Proceedings of Seventh International Conference, 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. 1998. “Law and Finance”. Journal of Political 
Economy 106.
20 | Media Syariah, Vol. XIII No. 1 Januari – Juni 2011
La Porta, R., R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and R.W.Vishny. 1996. “Law and Finance,” NBER 
Working Paper.
Levine, R., Loayza, N., Beck, T. 2000. “Financial intermediation and growth: Causality and causes”, 
Journal of Monetary Economics 46.
Mohsin, M. 1982. ‘Profile of ribafree banking’, in M. Ariff (ed.), Islamic Banking in Southeast Asia. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Naqvi, S.N.H. 1981. Ethics and Economics: An Islamic Synthesis. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation.
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Qureshi, Anwar Iqbal. 1946. Islam and the Theory of Interest. Lahore: n.p.
Siddiqi, M.N. 1985. Partnership and Profit Sharing in Islamic Law. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation.
______. 1983. Banking Without Interest. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation.
______. 1983. Issues in Islamic Banking. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation.
______. 1988. “Islamic Banking: theory and practice,” in M. Ariff (ed.), Islamic Banking in Southeast 
Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
______. 1982. “Islamic Approaches to Money, Banking and Monetary Policy: A Review,” in M. Ariff 
(ed.), Islamic Banking in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
The Mejelle (Art. 103), translated by Tyser, C.R., D.G. Demetriades and Ismail Haqqi Effendi. Kuala 
Lumpur: The Other Press.
Tohirin, A. and A.G., Ismail. 2010. “Islam law and finance.” Humanomics.
Torile, J. 2002. Financial Crises, Liquidity, and the International Monetary System. Princeton University 
Press.
Uzair, Mohammad. 1955. An Outline of `Interestless Banking›. Karachi: Raihan Publications.
Wajdi, A.D. 2008. “Corporate Governance and Stakeholder Management: An Islamic Approach,” 
dalam Bakar. M.D. and Rabiah, E.A. (Ed.s). Essential Readings in Islamic Finance. Kuala Lumpur: 
CERT.
Williamson, Oliver E. 1996. “Economic Organization: The Case for Candor,” Academy of Management 
Review, 21.
Williamson, Oliver E. 1996. The Mechanisms of Governance. New York, NY, Oxford University Press.
